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Taxation and Multinational Activity: New Evidence, New Interpretations
TARIFF reductions, falling transport costs, and re-
duced barriers to international capital flows have
created extensive opportunities for multinational firms
operating in increasingly integrated global markets. In
the midst of rapid integration and globalization, firms
still face tax systems that differ among countries, and
these differences have the potential to affect major in-
vestment and financing decisions. Indeed, high-profile
examples of countries such as Ireland that use tax pol-
icy to attract multinational firms highlight the role of
taxation in attracting foreign direct investment, which
in turn contributes to economic growth. Governments
anxious to attract foreign direct investment often con-
sider the use of tax incentives to lure multinational
firms. Similarly, governments of foreign direct invest-
ment source countries, including the United States, of-
ten wonder whether their tax treatment of foreign
income is appropriate. Scholarship on the effect of tax-
ation on foreign direct investment, however, has been
limited by an inability to observe how decisionmaking
within firms reflects tax considerations.
sources. First, the BEA data on the foreign operations
of U.S. multinational firms are drawn from all foreign
affiliates—foreign branches as well as separately incor-
porated foreign subsidiaries. Because the tax treat-
ments of these two types of foreign affiliates differ,
comparisons of the behavior of incorporated and un-
incorporated affiliates provide useful indicators of the
1. For a discussion of the most recent data collected, see Raymond J.
Mataloni Jr., "U.S. Multinational Companies: Operations in 2003," Survey
of Current Business 85 (July 2005): 9-29. For general information on the
statistics that are available on U.S. multinational firms, see Raymond J.
Mataloni Jr., "A Guide to BEA Statistics on U.S. Multinational Companies,"
Survey 65 (March 1995): 38-55.
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impact of taxation. Second, in contrast to some of the
data provided to tax authorities, the BEA filings are not
contingent on repatriations (which is usually the tax-
able event from the U.S. perspective) and include oper-
ating information. Thus, the BEA filings profile all of a
firm's activity abroad every year. Third, the BEA data
provide information not only on income taxes, but
also on indirect taxes (such as excise taxes and value
added taxes) paid by the foreign affiliates of U.S. multi-
national firms. Finally, reporting in the BEA data fol-
lows generally accepted U.S. accounting principles,
and the financial information collected is filed through
U.S. entities familiar with such practices; therefore, it is
not necessary to make the problematic assumptions
that are normally required in order to analyze financial
information collected in different countries. The rich
variety of operating information for parents and their
affiliates also allows for analysis that controls for a vari-
ety of confounding factors.
In addition to providing a rich source for financial
eral government."1 Similar programs have been estab-
lished at the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. These programs recognize that some research
1. Anne Y. Kester, ed., Behind the Numbers: U.S. Trade in the World
Economy, National Research Council, Panel on Foreign Trade Statistics
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992): 73.
requires data at a more detailed level than that provided
in publicly disseminated tabulations, and they help to
ensure that the data are fully utilized and that the exper-
tise and analytical perspectives of leading economic
researchers are brought to bear in their analysis.
At BEA, this work is conducted under strict guidelines
and procedures that protect the confidentiality of com-
pany-specific data, as required by law. Because the pro-
gram exists for the express purpose of advancing scien-
tific knowledge and because of legal requirements that
limit the use of the data to analytical and statistical pur-
poses, appointment to special-sworn-employee status
under this program is limited to researchers. Appoint-
ments are not extended to persons affiliated with organi-
zations that collect taxes, enforce regulations, or make
policy. BEA screens research outputs before publication
to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed,
but the views expressed represent those of the research-
ers.
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Previous economic studies have investigated the in-
fluence of corporate income taxes on international di-
rect investment. However, the existing literature has
considerably less to say about the relationship between
direct investment and other types of taxation or about
the possibility that the documented relationships may
reflect indirect taxes as well as income taxes. Indirect
taxes, which are defined as taxes other than corporate
income taxes, have grown rapidly over the last several
decades and may have a comparable, or greater, impact
on investment decisionmaking than do income taxes.
In our paper "Foreign Direct Investment in a World
of Multiple Taxes," we compare the effect of corporate
income taxes on investment by U.S. multinational
firms with the effect of indirect taxes. Foreign indirect
tax obligations of U.S. multinational firms are signifi-
cant, exceeding 1.5 times their direct tax obligations
(chart 1). In addition, many countries, including the
United States, permit multinational firms to claim for-
eign tax credits for corporate income taxes paid to for-
inputs and towards tax deductible inputs such as labor.
As a consequence, corporate income taxes encourage
firms to reduce their capital-labor ratios, while indirect
taxes do so to a much lesser degree. The evidence is
consistent with these predictions, in that high corpo-
rate income tax rates depress affiliate capital-labor ra-
tios and profit rates, while high indirect tax rates have
no discernible effects on these variables.
Thus, high corporate income tax rates are associated
with reduced levels of foreign direct investment be-
cause they increase the costs of using capital, they en-
courage taxpayers to substitute labor for capital, and
they affect the returns to reallocating taxable income.
High indirect tax rates reduce foreign direct invest-
ment through just one of these channels, that of
greater costs, but the magnitude of their impact is
comparable with that of income taxes, partly reflecting
the fact that tax credits are not available for indirect tax
payments.
February 2006
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Taxation and the Financing
of Foreign Direct Investment
Tax systems generally permit corporations to deduct
interest expenses in calculating taxable income, but
they do not permit corresponding deductions for divi-
dend payments to shareholders. Such systems encour-
age the use of debt at the expense of equity, an
incentive that is stronger at higher tax rates. While it is
widely appreciated that tax systems create such incen-
tives, estimating the sensitivity of capital structure to
corporate income tax rates has proven to be difficult.
Countries typically subject similar corporations to
similar tax rates, thus limiting tax-rate differences and
making it difficult to identify the effects of taxation us-
ing data drawn from firms in the same country. Recent
efforts using cross-country samples exploit the rich
variations that international comparisons offer, but
these efforts frequently face problems associated with
nonstandardized measurement across countries and
small sample sizes. Consequently, it is hardly surpris-
ing that several studies report no effects or unexpected
relationships between tax incentives and the use of
our estimates, 1-percent higher tax rates are associated
with 0.19-percent higher external borrowing but 0.35-
percent higher borrowing from parent companies.
Thus, it appears that multinationals opportunistically
use their internal capital markets to structure financ-
ing in response to tax-rate differences around the
world. In addition to measuring the impact of tax-rate
differences, the study also considers the effects of ex-
ternal financing costs on proclivities to finance invest-
ments with external and internal funds. Specifically,
the paper demonstrates that multinational firms face
higher borrowing costs in countries with less well de-
veloped capital markets, and affiliates in those coun-
tries are relatively heavily financed by loans from their
parent companies.
Chart 2. Affiliate Capital Structure and Host
Country Tax Rates, 1994
Leverage
Less than 20 percent to less 40 percent
20 percent than 40 percent or more
Host country corporate tax rates
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Taxation and Repatriation Policies
The U.S. system of taxing foreign income has attracted
a great deal of scholarly and legislative attention in re-
cent years. For example, the American Jobs Creation Act
of2004 featured temporarily reduced taxes on repatria-
tions from abroad in order to encourage firms to repa-
triate foreign profits that could then be used to finance
domestic investment. This rationale relies on the idea
that dividend repatriations from foreign affiliates of
U.S. multinational firms are significantly affected by
repatriation taxes, a proposition tested in our paper
"Repatriation Taxes and Dividend Distortions."
The United States taxes the foreign incomes of U.S.
companies. grants credits for foreign income taxes paid.
and defers taxes due on the unrepatriated earnings of af-
filiates that are separately incorporated abroad. This sys-
tem thus effectively imposes repatriation taxes that
inversely vary with foreign tax rates and that differ for
affiliates organized as separate corporations and
branches because the profits of foreign branches are
taxed as they are earned and therefore do not trigger
additional tax liabilities upon repatriation. Some ob-
enterprise zones in the United States. and historically
tax-favored regions such as eastern Germany, southern
Italy, and eastern Canada.
U.S. multinational firms make extensive use of for-
eign tax havens. As of 1999. nearly 60 percent of U.S.
firms with significant foreign operations had an affili-
ate presence in tax-haven countries. In our study "The
Demand for Tax Haven Operations." we use the BEA
affiliate-level data to identify the characteristics of
firms that use tax havens and the purposes that tax-ha-
ven operations serve. The results of the paper's empiri-
cal tests indicate that tax-haven operations facilitate
tax avoidance both by permitting firms to allocate tax-
able income away from high-tax jurisdictions and by
reducing the burden of home country taxation of for-
eign income.
The data suggest that large multinational firms with
extensive foreign operations are the most likely to op-
erate in tax havens and that this pattern reflects global
tax-avoidance strategies. U.S. multinational firms are
more likely to establish new tax-haven operations if
their nontax-haven investments are growing rapidly.
which generally confirms the notion that more foreign
investment increases the potential return to using tax
havens. The analysis shows that 1-percent greater sales
and investment growth in nearby nontax-haven coun-
tries is associated with a 1.5-to-2-percent greater likeli-
hood of establishing a tax-haven operation.
Larger tax-haven countries support a broad range of
business activities and thereby afford companies the
greatest opportunities to locate taxable profits. The ev-
idence is that multinational parents in industries in
which firms typically face high foreign tax rates. in in-
dustries that are technology intensive. and in indus-
tries characterized by extensive intrafirm trade are the
February 2006
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most likely to operate in large, rather than small, tax
havens. The data also show that ownership of an affili-
ate in a large tax-haven country is associated with re-
duced tax payments elsewhere in the same region.
These results are consistent with the notion that multi-
national firms have become adept at using financial
transactions, intrafirm trade, and transfers of intangi-
ble property to reallocate taxable income to low-tax ju-
risdictions.
U.S. multinational parents in industries in which
firms typically face low foreign tax rates also have par-
ticularly strong reasons to operate in tax havens. The
U.S. policy of taxing foreign profits from foreign sub-
sidiaries only when repatriated, together with the sys-
tem of granting credits for foreign tax payments,
implies that the profits earned in low-tax foreign coun-
rather than directly by a parent, can make investors
from home countries that tax worldwide incomes and
that grant foreign tax credits considerably more sensi-
tive to foreign tax-rate differences than they would be
otherwise. Indirect ownership has this effect by reduc-
ing the burden of home country taxes. In doing so, in-
direct ownership mitigates the feature of foreign tax
credit systems that provides investors with limited in-
centives to avoid foreign taxes, because they are enti-
tled to claim credits against home country taxes.
Indirect ownership can arise as a consequence of
Chart 3. The Role of Chains of Ownership in U.S.
Direct Investment Abroad, 1982-1997
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two strategies commonly suggested by lawyers that
specialize in international tax planning. In the first,
foreign earnings that would otherwise be repatriated
are used to purchase equity in other existing foreign af-
filiates. This triangular strategy (so called because
ownership of the indirectly held affiliate is split be-
tween the parent and one of its affiliates, producing a
triangular ownership chart) adds to, or replaces, the
original equity from the parent in the indirectly held
affiliate with earnings from the operations of another
foreign affiliate. In the second indirect ownership
strategy, a multinational firm uses retained earnings
from foreign operations to capitalize its initial invest-
ments in new foreign affiliates. The parent firm then
has no direct ownership stake in the new foreign affili-
ate; instead, it owns it indirectly through one or more
tiers of other foreign affiliates. The function of this
strategy is similar to that of the triangular strategy; it
also reduces the cost of taxes due upon repatriation by
research using these data, only grows in importance.
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